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ABSTRACT
The stem cell story is not a simple story but a complex
narrative: one that requires careful analysis in order to
identify major themes and plots. This paper offers an
analysis of the ethics of the clinical application of stem
cells and argues that even quite risky therapies can be
ethical. These arguments cannot be used to justify all
aspects of contemporary stem cell science, including
human embryonic stem cell science, which remains
theoretical and speculative. It is argued that the
homogenisation of stem cell science obscures the
distinction between clinical application and experimental
laboratory science in a morally problematic way.
The stem cell story tells of a limitless supply of
personalised replacement body cells. No more
diabetes or heart disease; no more Parkinson’s
disease or dementia. Indeed, some go so far as to
speculate that it will be possible to regenerate
virtually all body parts.1
The hope that stem cell science will prove to be a
comprehensive treatment has captured the popular
imagination, though some have been disquieted by
the means used to achieve this utopian end.
Destructive embryo research and the use of aborted
tissues are repugnant to some, leading several
commentators to respond that repugnance has no
place in the moral evaluation of the science,2
whereas other emotions such as naive optimism
for the science are equally problematic but rarely
singled out for criticism. The hyperbole of hope as
captured by the Korean commemorative stamp,
showing a paralysed man leaping from his wheel-
chair, typifies the Faustian over-reaching of some
stem cell advocates.3 4
That stem cell science is advanced as an
unmitigated public good also raises questions
about how such goods are defined. The ‘‘good’’
hovers between the clinical benefit of current
technology, the hope of future benefit, and
amorphous economic benefits. Each aspect adds
to the obstacle of enabling ‘‘the public’’ to develop
an informed opinion on the reality of stem cell
science. Understanding stem cells is a challenge, as
the sources of information are also part of the
problem: overhyped media reports,4 5 overenthu-
siastic critical commentary6 and the unfortunate
history of science conducted in secret, which casts
a shadow over contemporary science policy and
practice.
The stem cell story is a complex tale. This paper
unpicks some of the complexities and identifies
some of the ethical challenges to be addressed. The
paper begins with an analysis of the ethics of the
clinical application of stem cells and argues that
even quite risky therapies can be ethical. These
arguments cannot, however, be used to justify all
aspects of stem cell science, and in particular
human embryonic stem (hES) cell science, which
remains theoretical and speculative. It is argued
that bringing together all aspects of stem cell
science under one rubric homogenises the field but
obscures important moral distinctions between
clinical application and experimental laboratory
science.
STEM CELLS AS THERAPY
The stem cell dream is a partial reality; many
patients have survived intensive chemoradiotherapy
by rescue with blood stem cells through either bone
marrow transplantation or (peripheral) blood stem
cell transplants. In the 60-year history of bone
marrow transplantation, leukaemia has changed
from being an almost universally fatal disease to a
disease permitting long-term survival. It is therefore
a just source of hope that future applications of stem
cells may work for a range of conditions; it is also an
important validation that stem cells do have clinical
application. Hence ,part of the stem cell story
concerns the ways in which they have become what
Thompson and others7 8 describe as ‘‘promissory
matter’’—entities endowed with hope and expecta-
tion for future possibilities.
Cancer is a serious disease and the application of
clinical and scientific knowledge to its amelioration
and cure is a good to be universally endorsed.
However the clinical success of stem cell therapy
cannot serve as a moral QED in the complex
terrain of stem cell science. The history of bone
marrow transplantation is not one of unqualified
success, as there are still significant scientific and
ethical challenges to be faced. However the
intuition that it is right to strive against a serious
human harm can only be a starting point in what
requires a considered and detailed moral evalua-
tion. The success of using blood stem cells to treat
serious disease provides a clear context in the
justificatory framework upon which contemporary
stem cell science draws. This framework harks
back to one of the earliest aspirations of medicine,
to discover the panacea. It is only relatively recently
in the history of medicine that clinical medicine
has become consistently successful in treating
disease.9 10 The treatment of cancer is again a case
in point, where the goal of curing cancer has been
pursued with the awareness of the risk that the
treatment may be as likely to harm or kill the
patient as the disease. Bone marrow transplanta-
tion was developed as much as a means of rescuing
a patient from iatrogenesis as it was a means of
providing a disease-free transplant ‘‘organ’’.11
ETHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Consequentialist reasoning in the form of risk–
benefit evaluation has been a mainstay of clinical
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medicine. Faced with an adult with acute leukaemia, it is
reasonable and just to treat the patient even when there is a risk
of serious harm, because what is at stake, inevitable death
without treatment, is so serious an outcome—although since
tissue-typing, prophylactic and supportive therapies have
improved, blood stem cells have become routine therapies.12
Reflecting upon the ethical aspects of bone marrow trans-
plantation, one can see that (at least) four familiar areas of
medical ethics are engaged: autonomy, beneficence, the sanctity
of life and instrumentalism. Autonomy, because even where
patients are well informed of the risks and chances of benefit,
they are often willing and eager to take the risks of treatment
but, should they so wish, to refuse that treatment even if death
will be the result. Beneficence is engaged because the aim of the
treatment is to achieve a major good for the patient—cure or
long-term remission from a potentially fatal disease—and for a
wider population of patients to do good by further proving the
principle of benefit. The sanctity of life is engaged because it is
accepted that a risk of death as an unintended side effect of a
treatment given with the intention of saving life is a moral
norm of medicine. Instrumentalism is also engaged if the
procedure is in any way experimental, as in a clinical trial.
Instrumental use of others is regarded as permissible if this is the
only proportionate means to achieve an important good.i
Autonomy, beneficence, sanctity of life and instrumentalism
are also familiar leitmotifs within the stem cell story. The
question for consideration here is whether the argument for
using risky but established stem cell therapies has any role in the
moral justification of future but as yet theoretical therapies. I
suggest not, since novel stem cell research is conducted on quite
different territories and includes diverse sources of cells: cord
blood, somatic tissues, and human and hybrid embryos. My
point is that the ethical reasoning that seems so robust in the
context of the actual clinical application of stem cell therapies
becomes attenuated and overshadowed by other important
considerations in the more esoteric context of hES cell research.
Returning to blood stem cells; the proximity of a gravely ill
patient to a risky but potentially beneficial therapy provides a
moral rationale for using the therapy. This model of justifica-
tion has become a routinised part of ethical clinical judgement.
Autologous (self) transplant is a particularly strong case; here
the risks are borne by the individual patient who is also the
person who has most to lose. The case becomes more complex
when considering allogeneic (donor) transplantation.
One of the limitations of autologous transplantation is the
risk of reinfusing the disease the procedure aims to treat,
reintroducing cancer stem cells along with the blood stem cells.
Using stem cells from a healthy donor avoids this problem, but
now it is necessary to consider the welfare and interests of other
individuals who would otherwise be at no physical risk but for
their willingness to act as donors. There are of course moral
complexities associated with live donation of any kind, but the
broader question of whether it is right to place healthy donors
at risk of harm has been resolved, in the routine instances where
the procedure is proven to be successful. blood stem cell
donation is a beneficent act, likely to achieve a major good for a
proportionately small risk of harm, and so long as the donor’s
autonomy is respected and welfare safeguarded, donation is
regarded as a justified form of instrumentalism.
For the recipient of a donor transplant, there is an additional
risk from a potentially fatal form of immune-response, graft-
versus-host disease.13 So regarding the ethical justification for
using a form of treatment with this particular risk, there is
further need to calculate the risks and benefits and to enable the
patient to make an informed decision. An early and abiding
challenge in the clinical application of stem cell therapies is,
therefore, to understand the science behind the phenomenon,
using this knowledge to seek new and safer sources of stem
cells. Hence, one of the important aspirations for hES cells is
lowering the risk of a serious immune response and thereby
overcoming one of the most serious limitations to current
clinical applications.
SEEKING NEW TERRITORY: STEM CELLS AND EMBRYOS
The search for sources of stem cells is where the stem cell story
becomes entwined with other epics of modern medicine: in
vitro fertilisation (IVF) and abortion.
IVF and the science of embryology that underpins it have
evolved techniques enabling the genetic analysis of the embryo
before implantation. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
also provides the means of selecting a sibling as a source of
tissue-matched fetal stem cells and bone marrow for an existing
and afflicted child. In the UK, the Human Fertility and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) have deliberated on a number
of instances in which a case has been made for using a
combination of IVF, PGD and embryo tissue typing.14 The
complex scenario of the so-called ‘‘saviour sibling’’ engages with
some of the same ethical concerns as for bone marrow
transplantation, but there can be no simple transposition of
one case to the other. Apparent in the testimony of families and
clinicians are the emotional and moral tensions involved.15 This
is not simply the case of sick patients deciding whether to
undergo a potentially beneficial treatment in which they are the
main risk bearer. The exposure of a normally fertile woman to
the not inconsiderable risks of IVF, the creation and instru-
mental use of a child that need not have been created through
IVF, and the probable destruction of surplus embryos create a
complex moral scenario. Add to this the risks to both donor and
recipient of the transplant procedure and the uncertainty as to
the future welfare of both, in circumstances in which the
interests and welfare of a family unit are inextricably linked,
then it becomes a difference in kind from ‘‘ordinary’’ bone
marrow transplantation.
Despite the differences, a clinical ethical case can still be made
for sibling donors, premised upon the strong possibility of
providing real benefit to an existing individual in circumstances
in which there is a growing body of evidence of the benefits and
risks of the procedure. However, a further twist to this success
story is the now flourishing industry that surrounds cord blood
banking. The principle of fetal stem cell transplantation is
sufficiently understood in the public domain for it to have
become a focus of speculative commercial venture by banking
cord blood as an insurance policy against future need. The
Virgin Health Bank (http://www.virginhealthbank.co.uk/), for
example, appeals both to altruism (a public bank in which
potential benefits are shared) and to self-interest (a plan in
which one’s child has a personal insurance policy guaranteeing
future use of stem cells).
Clinical ‘‘waste’’ hence becomes a future insurance, sold with
the rhetoric of certain benefit and drawing upon the future
promise of stem cell science but with no strong evidence that
individual donors are likely to need or would in fact benefit
from their ‘‘deposit’’.7 This is but one more example of the
i The instrumental use of others in medical science is clearly subject to the Declaration
of Helsinki caveat that the interests of the individual are above the interests of science
and society.
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deliberate homogenisation of stem cells, which blurs the
boundary between the proven clinical benefits of blood stem
cells and the still highly experimental status of hES cells. This
blurring of boundaries is problematic in two ways: for
individuals who are approached to contribute to research
through tissue donation, and for the wider citizenry who are
required to both understand and approve national programmes
of research.
MORAL STATUS AND TISSUE ECONOMIES
Stem cells as such have no intrinsic moral value, but the
progenitors of stem cells do. However, most ethical concerns are
satisfied, at least in adult donation, so long as the donation is a
free and informed, autonomous decision. Significantly, an
important component of what informs the bone marrow
transplantation donor is the high likelihood that the donation
will benefit an existing patient. Blood stem cells are exemplars
of the promissory future of hES cells; however, the further away
from clinical application and the more complex the networks of
exchanges between progenitor and recipient, the more difficult
it becomes to equate blood stem cells and hES cells.
In contrast to blood stem cells, hES cells are not donated
directly nor are they currently donated for the immediate
therapeutic application, although this is a matter of some
misunderstanding by those approached to donate tissue for
research. hES cells are rather created by scientists from donated
eggs and embryos for the purposes of theoretical research.
Hence, the question of hES cells engages the issue of moral
status, because they may be obtained only by the destruction of
human embryos, which are regarded by some as having a moral
value significant to the debate, although the point is disputed.16
I do not wish to pursue this dispute here, but rather wish to
raise a different question of value. Both blood and embryonic
stem cells, like many other human tissues, are regarded as
‘‘precious’’ by those who need, use and exchange them.17–21 Of
course, precious, like many value terms, is conveniently
ambiguous between notions of monetary value, instrumental
value and intrinsic value. There is no doubt that some human
tissues (eggs, embryos and fetuses) are regarded as valuable for
their relative scarcity. But the ambiguity around the term
precious allows further ambiguity about the ‘‘value’’ of these
tissues. This ambiguity is, paradoxically, accompanied by a
deliberate ambivalence regarding status and value, particularly
when it is necessary to justify the procurement and use of
tissues in controversial circumstances. By diminishing the
‘‘value’’, in all senses of the term, it strengthens the case for
putting them to alternative use. One of the earliest examples of
the diminishment of value is the ‘‘argument from waste’’,
which legitimises the procurement and use of human tissue that
would otherwise be disposed of.
THE ARGUMENT FROM WASTE
John Rock, an early pioneer of IVF research, rationalised his
strategy of seeking embryos in the organs removed at
hysterectomy by arguing that the procedure was clinically
necessary and that the tissues, embryo and all, would normally
be incinerated.20 The idea that this was merely judicious use of
waste is belied by Rock’s elaborate preoperative preparation of
these women, timing the surgery to occur immediately after the
woman’s most fertile period and encouraging sexual intercourse
to increase the probability of pregnancy at the time of surgery.
There is no doubt that the discovery of early human embryos
was a prize valued by Rock and colleagues, who did not consider
their actions parallel to surgical abortion.20 It remains an open
question to this day just how well informed these patients were
of Rock’s intentions, although there is no question that they
were very well cared for; receiving free treatment from a
recognised expert.ii This exchange of ‘‘surgical waste’’ for expert
services is but one example of the kind of complex exchange
that makes up the expanding tissue economy. The paradox is
that terms denoting low or no value, such as waste, surplus and
spare are so frequently used to describe material that, once
obtained, becomes of significant future value. These were some
of the issues in dispute in the now infamous case of Moore v The
Regents of the University of California, in which a patient, while
endeavouring to be rid of his disease, became also the
uninformed source of tissues for a potentially profitable
commercial venture.21
The quest for new tissues with research potential presents
quite different challenges for the issues of autonomy, benefi-
cence, instrumentalism and the sanctity of life and marks a
significant distinction between tissues obtained for research and
those obtained for therapeutic purposes.
Postimplantation tissues obtained after abortion are also a
source of stem cells. In England, women are unlikely to be
informed of the exact uses of their tissues.18 22 Naomi Pfeffer23
reports the views of women undergoing termination of
pregnancy, confirming that women invited to donate their
tissue for research know little of the purpose of such research.
Pfeffer’s work reveals that once the women had a better
understanding of stem cell research and its ambition to create
‘‘immortal’’ cell lines, they found this use of their tissue
troubling, because of ‘‘its apparent capacity to somehow
reinstate and even develop the fetus’s physical existence and
social biography beyond abortion, the very thing abortion is
meant to eliminate’’ (p2553).23 The situation in England that
prevents women from exercising their discretion through
consent is due to the abiding influence of the 1989
Polkinghorne guidelines.24 These Department of Health regula-
tions were designed to prevent women deliberately conceiving
in order to be donors of tissue, such as fetal neural stem cells, for
an ailing relative or for a particular research purpose.
The use of postimplantation tissues makes a notable contrast
to that of preimplantation tissues, where women undergoing
IVF create embryos knowing that a proportion of them will be
donated to stem cell research. While the preimplantation donors
are on the face of it much better informed, empirical work in the
field is disclosing interesting data regarding donors, attitudes
towards their embryos.19 25 What is yet to be explored is
whether donors have later reason to regret their decision in the
light of a failed IVF treatment, knowing that their ‘‘other’’
embryos exist as immortal cell lines or as possible future
children.26 Women invited to donate embryos and eggs for stem
cell research are in a complex and potentially vulnerable
position.19 25
Eggs, embryos and other tissues, bought and sold for cash or
benefit in kind, are valuable tokens of exchange in a thriving
tissue economy. As Jasanoff27 has convincingly argued, there is a
real global economy of human tissue, which adds further
complexity to the stem cell story. For individual actors within
this market, it is unclear whether one must abide by the full
ii While it may be inappropriate to apply contemporary standards of informed consent
to Rock’s work it nevertheless raises issues resonant in contemporary contexts in
which, for example, embryo donors are not straightforwardly autonomous, informed,
altruists.
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rules of commerce or whether there are constraints on both
buyer and seller of altruism and public spiritedness.
The stem cell story is not a singular story, but a complex tale
playing to important human aspirations and vulnerabilities.
The homogenisation of stem cells, which blurs the distinction
between current proven clinical application of stem cells and the
highly experimental and speculative nature of hES cell research,
is one of the challenges in the ethics of stem cell research.
Without this separation, it is impossible for citizens and policy-
makers to distinguish the social and ethical complexities of the
story. The admixture of commercial speculation and appeal to
human altruism transforms the donation, storage and exchange
of human tissues into a complex tissue economy in which
individuals are asked to play patient, donor and speculator.
Scientific ambition, real clinical need and the prospect of
commercial benefit are just some of the subplots that add to the
complexity. There are also other significant social and ethical
issues at stake: instrumental use of humans, commodification of
the body and continuing challenge to the ontological status of
the ‘‘human’’.
One area of hES cell research has the merit of scientific and
moral honesty. Research utilising the ‘‘cytoplasmic hybrid
embryo’’28 has caused great public controversy, yet at second
glance has much to recommend it. The cytoplasmic hybrid
embryo is created by transferring human genetic material into
an enucleated animal egg, with the resulting ‘‘embryo’’ used as a
source of hES cells for research purposes. The hybrid embryo is
regulated as for any human embryo and cannot be kept beyond
14 days of development, although in all likelihood it could not
survive beyond this time (Dr Lyle Armstrong, Newcastle
University, personal communication).
The issue of creating cytoplasmic hybrids is seen by some as
challenging the very nature of what it is to be human.29 Yet the
work has important merits, enabling scientists to understand
and improve upon current techniques of cell nuclear transfer,
study the genetic basis of disease, lay the foundations for future
cell based therapies and test novel drugs with the need for fewer
animal experiments. In addition, there are three further aspects
of hybrid research to note. The first is that the research is very
clear about the experimental nature of embryonic stem cell
research, representing a step back for scientists, who have
acknowledged the need to study further the basic techniques
and mechanisms of producing hES cell lines. The second is that
it emphasises the gap between clinical applications of, for
example, blood stem cells and the speculative use of embryonic
stem cells in therapy. Third the hybrid research can operate at
a clear remove from the IVF clinic with its potential for the
exploitation of the donors of human eggs and embryos.
CONCLUSIONS
The stem cell story is far from finished and this paper has only
touched upon the moral complexity of the tale. The therapeutic
use of certain kinds of stem cell has become established, and, as I
have argued, the moral case for their use has been routinised.
However, there must be separation between what is currently
possible and what is merely speculated. Human embryonic stem
cells remain experimental and still require major programmes of
basic science before their potential can be applied. Moreover, the
research programmes for hES cell require the use of human
tissue obtained in diverse and morally complex ways. A major
challenge for the ethics of stem cell science is therefore to
address the ethical issues at play within the evolving tissue
economies.
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